{"id":43455,"date":"2024-02-02T17:39:39","date_gmt":"2024-02-02T22:39:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/allianceadvisors.com\/blackrock-voting-policy-2024-taiwan\/"},"modified":"2025-03-17T17:45:49","modified_gmt":"2025-03-17T21:45:49","slug":"blackrock-voting-policy-2024-taiwan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/allianceadvisors.com\/zh-hans\/blackrock-voting-policy-2024-taiwan\/","title":{"rendered":"BlackRock Voting Policy 2024: Taiwan"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Policy Segment: Board and Elections<\/span><\/h2>\n

The board should establish and maintain a framework of robust and effective governance mechanisms to support its oversight of the company’s strategy and operations consistent with the long-term economic interests of investors. There should be clear descriptions of the role of the board and the committees of the board and how directors engage with and oversee management. We look to the board to articulate the effectiveness of these mechanisms in overseeing the management of business risks and opportunities and the fulfillment of the company’s purpose and strategy.<\/p>\n

Where a company has not adequately disclosed and demonstrated that its board has fulfilled these corporate governance<\/a> and risk oversight responsibilities, we will consider voting against the re-election of directors who, on our assessment, have particular responsibility for the issues. We assess director performance on a case-by-case basis and in light of each company’s circumstances, taking into consideration our assessment of their governance, business practices that support durable, long-term value creation, and performance. Set out below are ways in which boards and directors can demonstrate a commitment to acting in the long-term economic interests of all shareholders.<\/p>\n

Regular accountability<\/strong><\/p>\n

It is our view that directors should stand for election on a regular basis, ideally annually. In our experience, annual director elections allow shareholders to reaffirm their support for board members and\/or hold them accountable for their decisions in a timely manner. When board members are not elected annually, in our experience, it is good practice for boards to have a rotation policy to ensure that, through a board cycle, all directors have had their appointment re-confirmed, with a proportion of directors being put forward for election at each annual general meeting.<\/p>\n

Effective Board composition<\/strong><\/p>\n

Regular director elections also give boards the opportunity to adjust their composition in an orderly way to reflect development of the company’s strategy and the market environment. In our view, it is beneficial for new directors to be brought onto the board periodically to refresh the group’s thinking while supporting both continuity and appropriate succession planning. We consider the average overall tenure of the board, and seek a balance between the knowledge and experience of longer-serving directors and the fresh perspectives of directors who joined more recently. We encourage companies to keep under regular review the effectiveness of their board (including its size), and assess directors nominated for election in the context of the composition of the board as a whole. This assessment should consider a number of factors, including each director’s independence and time commitments, as well as the diversity and relevance of director experiences and skillsets, and how these factors may contribute to the performance of the company.<\/p>\n

We believe that directors are in the best position to assess the composition and optimal size of the board but we would be concerned if a board seemed too small to have an appropriate balance of directors or too large to be effective.<\/p>\n

We expect the board to establish a robust process to evaluate the performance of the board as a whole and the contributions of each director. BlackRock believes that annual performance reviews of directors and the board contribute to a more efficiently functioning board.<\/p>\n

Board independence<\/strong><\/p>\n

In our view, there should be a sufficient number of independent directors, free from conflicts of interest or undue influence from connected parties, to ensure objectivity in the decision-making of the board and its ability to oversee management. Common impediments to independence may include but are not limited to:<\/p>\n